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Jann E SchlimmeAbstract
In this paper the question of autonomy in delusional disorders is investigated using a phenomenological approach. I
refer to the distinction between freedom of intentional action, and freedom of the will, and develop phenomenological
descriptions of lived autonomy, taking into account the distinction between a pre-reflective and a reflective type.
Drawing on a case report, I deliver finely-grained phenomenological descriptions of lived autonomy and experienced
self-determination when acting on delusions. This analysis seeks to demonstrate that a person with delusions can be
described as responsible for her behaviour on a ‘framed’ level (level of freedom of intentional action), even though she
is not autonomous on a higher (‘framing’) level (level of freedom of the will), if, and only if, the goods of agency for
herself and others are respected. In these cases the person with delusions is very nearly comparable to people in love,
who are also not free to choose their convictions, and who could also be rightly held responsible for the behaviour
flowing from their convictions.
Keywords: Phenomenology, Delusional convictions, Delusional habituality, Self-determination, Autonomy,
Goods of agency, Double-orientation to realityIntroduction
Persons with delusions often claim to be autonomous if
they are behaving in accordance with their delusional con-
victions. Can this claim be justified? In order to address
this question I will develop fine-grained descriptions of
experiences of autonomy, or of feeling free and self-
determined, if acting on delusions from the first-person-
perspective. However, investigating the experiential structure
of being autonomous from the first-person-perspective
faces a fundamental problem: employing methods that
focus on the experiential structure from the first-person-
perspective, like phenomenological methods, offer de-
scriptions of the experiential structure, but not moral
justifications. The phenomenological method, as applied
in this paper, might therefore not appear well suited for
this question. Nonetheless, it would be absurd if experi-
ences of autonomy would not differ somehow from those
experiences in which a person is, in spite of her own
experience of feeling free and self-determined, not autono-
mous. Possible features of such a self-deception in delu-
sions could be the impossibility of falsifying one’sCorrespondence: schlimme.jann@gmx.de
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reproduction in any medium, provided the orconvictions during ongoing delusions and the highly pri-
vate character of delusional convictions not shared with
one’s community. Hence the question remains: Is a person
with delusions simply and generally deceived regarding a
given experience of autonomy, if acting on delusions?
In order to proceed, I first present a short phenom-
enological description of delusional convictions, mainly
drawing on the German tradition of phenomenological
psychopathology (Phenomenological psychopathology of
delusional convictions section). In a subsequent (The
experiential structure of lived autonomy section) I provide
a preliminary phenomenological description of lived au-
tonomy, drawing on recently published work, and will
then discuss lived autonomy in delusions more closely
(Delusion-related alterations of lived autonomy section).
In this Introduction section offer a detailed description of
delusion-related alterations of lived autonomy, whether on
the level of freedom of intentional action or of freedom of
the will. Basically, I argue that freedom on the level of
intentional action can be sufficient for profound auton-
omy, if the goods of agency are respected; and I attempt to
demonstrate that persons with delusions are, in this re-
spect, partially comparable – although with notable dis-
tinctions – to people in love. Lastly, in Limitations of lived
autonomy in delusions section, I discuss this argument
with respect to clinical aspects.d. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
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Delusional convictions can be understood as highly pri-
vate, explicitly known and incorrigible convictions which
have gained the status of a ‘justified belief ’, although being
unjustifiable (and non-falsifiable) in discourse. According
to the German tradition of phenomenological psychopath-
ology two criteria can be named for delusional convictions:
a) the extraordinary degree of conviction concerning par-
ticular ideas; and b) the outright rejection of alternative
explanations, the so called Unkorrigierbarkeit (incorrigibil-
ity) of these convictions (ideas). The impossibility of the
delusional content, which is often the most prominent fea-
ture in clinical settings, is only an accessory criterion for
the psychopathological finding of delusional convictions. It
merely indicates the private character of these convictions
(see p. 216 ff; p. 157 f.) [1-3]. These psychopathological cri-
teria mirror the well-known fact that a deluded person’s
feelings, valuings, thoughts and behaviour are pre-
reflectively prescribed by her delusional convictions. We
can therefore summarize that there are two characteristics
distinguishing delusional convictions from other and (vol-
untarily) self-imposed commitments:
a) The person with delusions is pre-reflectively altered
according to these convictions in the sense that her
critical abilities are in line with her delusional
convictions. In short: The deluded person cannot be
self-critical with respect to her delusional convictions
[4]. This is a classical insight in psychopathology (see
already Sandberg [5]; Jaspers [6] p. 46: “Die Kritik […]
stellt sich in den Dienst des Wahns”). Of course, one’s
pre-reflective structure corresponds (more or less)
one’s basic convictions. Importantly, however, the
person with delusions need not try to convince herself
of her delusional convictions; she always already is
convinced. This holds true even if she tests the validity
of her delusional convictions in the course of their
development, because they appear just too bizarre from
her point of view.
b) The deluded person is (“per definitionem”)
ineffective and helpless with respect to altering these
convictions. This missing effectivity is the basic
impairment in persons with delusions. It is also an
impairment of her freedom of the will. In other words:
a person with delusions is pre-reflectively altered in
such a way that she is unable to retrospectively find
out for herself that she was and still is deceived. This
is the highest form of self-deception. In other words:
as long as the delusions are maintained, such self-
deception is undetectable. The person with delusions is
not able, despite all changes in her life situation or her
attitude, to reframe these convictions as interpretations
or justified beliefs (else she would not hold thesedelusional convictions any more). Nonetheless, she
might be able, as I will argue in this paper with
reference to a case report, to momentarily suspend her
delusional experiences adopting a more common-
sensical attitude without truly criticizing her delusional
convictions (called a ‘double-orientation to reality’, see
Jaspers, p. 101; 4; [6-9]).
The experiential structure of lived autonomy
In this section I will argue for a distinction between two
different types of lived autonomy: a pre-reflective and a
reflective type of lived autonomy. This distinction is a
very broad distinction. Nonetheless, it allows for pro-
found phenomenological descriptions of symptom-
related alterations of lived autonomy, as I demonstrated
in recent publications [10,11]. What is meant with these
two types of lived autonomy?
Autonomy requires us to behave responsibly and to be
able to provide appropriate reasons for our behaviour.
Usually, we would expect such a moral agent to be able
to display the following abilities: to develop intentions
for his behaviour, to show a certain effectivity of his be-
haviour with respect to his intentions, to judge his be-
haviour independently from his intentions, and to
provide reasons for his behaviour. Accordingly, an agent
displaying these abilities in a given situation should ex-
perience himself as autonomous. For this experience of
autonomy, deliberation is required in order to recognise
and effectively perform those actions that are in one’s
best interest, including one’s moral interests p. 46 [12]. I
would like to call this the “reflective type of lived auton-
omy, which can be experienced if delivering a well-
founded (moral) justification for one’s behaviour or one’s
behavioural intentions, goals or values, whether one
realises them in one’s behaviour or not (‘self-effectivity’)
or whether they are in accordance with one’s deepest or
long-term interests or not (‘authenticity’). This type in-
volves, of course, freedom of the will, but it may also
involve freedom of intentional action (authenticity,
effective and responsible self-realisation)” [11].
This reflective type of lived autonomy does not cap-
ture our usual experience of being, or feeling, free. On
the contrary, we usually experience ourselves as ‘free’ in
those situations in which we are not explicitly self-
conscious. Nonetheless, in these experiences we, as
agents interested in autonomous behaviour, usually pre-
reflectively anticipate that we would be able to explicitly
evaluate our accustomed behaviour as morally justified
(i.e., from some future point of view). Of course, this an-
ticipation does not imply that we would actually judge
our behaviour as morally justified if explicitly evaluating
it. Nonetheless, if we follow virtuous customs, habits or
traditions in our behaviour, we might indeed behave in a
morally justified manner without explicit deliberation
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would therefore like to define the pre-reflective type of
lived autonomy as a type of autonomy, “which can be ex-
perienced through customary behaviour or in those ac-
tions in which we are focused on the things at hand. This
type may, of course, involve freedom of the will, but it
corresponds at least a freedom of intentional action” [11].
From a phenomenological point of view, both types of
lived autonomy are prescribed by our habituality, that is:
our habitualised perceptions and value-apprehensions,
our styles of thinking and behaving, our values and life-
goals (‘projects’) and our current emotional states and
interests, as has especially been pointed out by John J.
Drummond [12,13,15,16]. Habituality is a phenomeno-
logical term that describes the passive and continuous dis-
closure of one’s life-world (Lebenswelt) and oneself in the
same constitutive manner. If this habituality of a person is
informed by virtues, she can indeed behave in a morally
justifiable manner, rendering this person autonomous in
the sense of an implied freedom of the will. Insofar, our
phenomenological description of lived autonomy obvi-
ously coincides with the fact that the majority of lived au-
tonomy is given in habitualised behaviour. This may
explain why models of virtuous ethics seem to be closely
related to moral agency [13,15]. Besides, living autono-
mously can, in itself, become familiar and habitualised,
entailing pre-reflective intentions of anticipation with
respect to the (moral) justification of one’s customary
behaviour.
Nonetheless, a person’s autonomy that would merely
rely on tradition and habituality could be arbitrary. In
order to behave autonomously in the situation in which
one is called upon to act, it is, not surprisingly, often
required to explicitly take one’s perceived action-
properties, pre-reflective valuations or willing acts into
account, and, hence, reflectively identify and evaluate
the goals, interests and values inherent in one’s pre-
reflective mental operations. This can entail experiences
of lived autonomy corresponding an explicitly chosen,
well-defended and justified behaviour (reflective type of
lived autonomy). Experiences of this reflective type of
lived autonomy may incrementally alter one’s habituality
and might therefore enable a more virtuous or authentic
manner of one’s pre-reflective behaviour in the long run
(pre-reflective type of lived autonomy). Nonetheless, this
autonomy-spiral does not render repeated reflection un-
necessary. On the contrary, since an autonomous and
responsible manner of life-conduct can never be taken for
granted, it is constantly required to guard one’s own and
other’s right to value, judge, decide and behave for oneself
(so called ‘goods of agency’; Drummond). Drummond cap-
tures this goal of autonomous and responsible behaviour
in the concept of authenticity, arguing that authentic
behaviour means the successful realisation of those valuesthe person in question values most (with respect to her
situation and life-conduct). “The authenticity of this kind
of life is responsible self-realization, taking responsibility
for one’s convictions and for disclosing the evidence that
warrants those convictions (for oneself or others J.S.)”
[16] p. 423.
Habituality and familiar workspace
Habituality is undergirded, as Husserl argued in his ‘genetic
phenomenology’, by pre-reflective intentions of anticipation
and their ongoing fulfilment (“Erwartungsintentionen”,
Husserl [17], §21-26). For example, the shape and style of
the objects in our situation as well as of many circum-
stances of our situation are prescribed precisely by our
intentions of anticipation on the perceptive (‘doxic’) level.
Furthermore, we perceive objects or circumstances as
usable or manageable in this or that manner. They display
specific action-properties, which we perceive immediately
as an invitation or option to handle them specifically
(called Zuhandenheit, Heidegger [18], p. 68 ff.; see also
recently [19]). To perceive a cup (as a cup) implies not
only the ‘perception’ of its bottom and backside, even
though we cannot see it at this moment, but also its use-
fulness for holding liquids (e.g., hot tea). In this
habitualised ‘production’ of Zeug, (i.e., a “thing”; and what
it takes to be such a thing) pre-reflective anticipations of
our capabilities guide our focus of consciousness towards
those goals that are achievable (and often, though not al-
ways or necessarily, valuable) for us in the given situation,
typically according to our momentary project we are en-
gaged with. Both the perceived action-properties and the
anticipated behavioural effectivity (action-abilities) as well
as their experienced fulfilment usually remain pre-
reflective in accustomed behaviour. They undergird pos-
sible elaborate and explicit expectations with respect to
the desired effects, unwanted side effects and the effectiv-
ity of our behaviour. Thus we, as embodied selves, habit-
ually disclose our own life-world to ourselves in the
manner of a familiar workspace and are thus at least usu-
ally embedded in at least partially familiar situations
(Schlimme [10,11]; ‘experiential workspace’ Talero [20];
similarly, Merleau-Ponty [21], pp. 164 ff.).
Disclosing the perceived action-properties of the ob-
jects and circumstances of our life-world according to
our habitualised intentions of anticipation describes only
one feature of our familiar workspace we inhabit as
agents. A second feature is the immediate and prima
facie valuing (“Wertnehmungen”; “value-apprehensions”,
valuing without further and explicit value-judgement) of
these non-axiological (action-)properties perceived in
our life-world. As Husserl noted, valuing acts are not
objectifying. Values are not material objects. Of course,
pre-reflective value-apprehensions can be objectified
secondarily in a reflective act as abstract values.
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refer to specific properties of perceived objects or actual
circumstances: “The value-apprehensions belong to a
different dimension. This dimension requires a further
dimension as a basis in which objectivity is already fully
constituted”. (Husserl [22], XXVIII, p. 262).
From a phenomenological vantage point, we can de-
scribe these pre-reflective valuing experiences as being
founded on a purely descriptive ‘objective sense’ of an
experienced object as the core of this experience.
Founded upon this core is a ‘feeling-moment’ in the
particular kind of act called (pre-reflective) valuing
(“Wertnehmung”). As Drummond has stated, the specific
moment of this act is “the affective response to the situ-
ation with its non-axiological properties” [12], p. 41.
Since only some features of this presented (or disclosed)
object are addressed in this affective response (we ex-
perience objects as bad, brute, elegant, fabulous, fresh,
frightening etc.), there is “something like an abstraction
at work in evaluation” [13], p. 19. This immediate and
pre-reflective abstraction, or particular selection that takes
place in the act of valuing, is prescribed by our (pre-re-
flective) interests, our habituality and momentary moods
and by the ‘projects’ we are engaged with [11,12] p. 22 ff.
Drummond summarises this idea in a recent paper:
“Value-attributes are the correlates of […] the affective re-
sponse of a subject with a particular experiential history –
that is, particular beliefs, emotional states, dispositions,
practical interests, and so forth – to the non-axiological
properties of an object or situation” [16], p. 416.
The immediate and pre-reflective evaluations of the
properties of an object or situation also refers to action-
properties, which are disclosed to oneself in one’s actual
situation according to one’s habituality and the ‘project’
one is engaged with. These action-properties, which in-
dicate the ‘possibility space’ of the person called upon to
act, are immediately and pre-reflectively (so to say, in a
‘second step’) affectively responded to. Thus some
action-properties might be valued as suitable and worth-
while and others as impractical and, hence, only provid-
ing the context of the behaviour one is about to choose.
In other words, goals that are valued as ‘worthy of pur-
suit’ are already pre-reflectively shaped as the attractive
ones according to our habituality and the ‘project’ we
are actually engaged with and disclosed as attractive be-
havioural options in our familiar workspace. This
worthiness is, at least sometimes coinciding and fuelled
by our pre-reflective anticipation of being able to per-
form successfully and to achieve intended and worth-
while goals as a result.
These descriptions argue for foundational relations be-
tween different levels of our mental lives. The perception
of action- or project-properties can be addressed as the
basic level. The next level is the level of pre-reflectivevaluations, which is connected with the doxic level of
perception by an affective response to these properties.
Based upon these two layers of habitually disclosing a fa-
miliar workspace (action-properties and the valuing of
these properties) is the conative level of willing acts.
Willing acts are directed by goals and goods that are
intertwined with the project one is actually engaged in,
whether explicitly recognized or not, and respond to
perceived and valued action- or project-properties by
willing them into existence (fiat). Adopting a certain
project-related attitude therefore implies to disclose the
familiar workspace in a certain, usually corresponding
manner. Consequently, one’s willing acts automatically
aim at project-relevant goals in their pre-reflective re-
sponse to adequately valued action-properties. If these
intentions of willing certain properties into existence be-
come fulfilled, since these properties can actually be per-
ceived, this “perceptual certainty (generates) the quality
of being born out of one’s willing” (Husserl [22], XXVIII,
p. 107, see p. 111). Depending on the perceived non-
axiological property and its context within the project
one is engaged in, this can also entail an experience of
(more or less) effectively pursuing one’s goals, whether
in pre-reflective valuing or explicit evaluation.
The effectivity of one’s behaviour in order to pursuit
and achieve one’s intended goal might not be object of
explicit deliberation if things are running smoothly,
herewith maintaining and supporting one’s habituality.
Nonetheless, this might be different if unwanted or un-
pleasant effects derive, or one’s behaviour remains inef-
fective regarding one’s intended goals. All these effects,
which might even be mediated by effected others, may
imply an explicit moral evaluation of one’s behaviour,
goals or even the manner of how one discloses one’s fa-
miliar workspace. Drawing on these fine-grained de-
scriptions of lived autonomy, we are now prepared to
investigate delusion-related alterations of lived auton-
omy in a more detailed way in the following section.
Delusion-related alterations of lived autonomy
A deluded person’s effectivity to pursue and achieve her
intended goals is specifically impaired and altered. This
is especially true with respect to goals directly deriving
from her delusional convictions. For example, you can-
not hide effectively from your persecutors. Even if you
are able to do so for a shorter period of time, i.e., if you
move your household from one apartment to another,
your sanctuary will usually not last long. A comparable
situation occurs if a deluded person is trying to convince
others of her divinity. Sometimes it may even complicate
matters if a deluded person uses behavioural strategies
in accordance with her delusional convictions.
Mrs. F.,a a 59-year old patient with chronic schizo-
phrenia, repeated psychotic (hallucinatory) experiences
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negative symptoms (i.e., abulia, apathy) for over 2 de-
cades, reported that she had had some kind of skin con-
dition at her feet roughly ten years ago and that her
grandmother, who had died many years before, talked to
her during an ‘apparition’, telling her that this was some
kind of “mycosis”. Mrs. F. was delusionally convinced to
have met the spirit of her grandmother, having already
had frequently apparitions of dead loved ones besides
those of completely unknown people. As she described
in detail, the bodies of these spirits were “translucent” or
even “transparent” and had obviously a different kind of
materiality, since “they can walk through walls”. Accord-
ingly Mrs. F. recognized immediately if she faced a spirit
or a normal person. She trusted this voice and appar-
ition to be her grandmother’s spirit and treated the skin
condition as if it were athlete’s foot, but without any suc-
cess. Two years later she visited a medical doctor, who
provided a totally different diagnosis which proved to be
correct, since his treatment quickly improved her condi-
tion. She commented on this experience: “The voice led
me astray. I cannot trust all voices. It is sometimes very
strenuous, to distinguish which voice is trustworthy”.
and “I don’t want to take it out on my grandmother,
since I don’t know if it was really her”.
Mrs. F. was, at her own discretion, treated during the
time when I took field-notes (transcriptions of our thera-
peutic sessions) without neuroleptic medication, since
she suffered extensive extrapyramidal side effects during
her first in-patient treatment decades ago. She described
this experience as follows: “The thoughts are racing, but
the body can do nothing. And the thoughts go like: How
shall that work, if I must go to the toilet? And then you
are asked: Do you still hear those voices? And when you
say ‘Yes’, you get those drops knocked back. Until my
guardian angel told me: You have to say ‘No’, otherwise
you will never get out here. – It is not easy not to tell
the truth”. Mrs. F. did not use any neuroleptics since her
release from the hospital, but sometimes used a light
sleeping pill for sedation (doxylamine) at a low dose (e.g.,
25 mg or less). She frequently went without this medica-
tion for days, using it only now and then. Neither her
scenic hallucinations, nor any of her other symptoms
except repeated sleeplessness were altered in frequency or
in intensity by this medication, as her reports demon-
strated most clearly.
Curiously, delusional topics are about human features
that human beings can never expect to be able to
change, but simply have to endure. In other words: in
delusions the missing pre-reflective effectivity is ‘per-
fectly externalized’; ‘perfectly’, because the delusional
topic is truly out of range for human beings. In one
word: we cannot expect us to change these facts (which
are delusional ‘facts’). Mrs. F. was convinced that herbasic problem resulted from evil spirits and their influ-
ence on her and others. Accordingly, it was paramount
to gain at least some influence over these evil spirits.
While these evil spirits usually kept away when she was
engaged with familiar persons (i.e., her loved ones and
family, or professional personnel from our Psychiatric
Outpatient Department), she had no direct influence on
these highly perplexing and sometimes horrifying appari-
tions. She received however, at least from her point of
view, profound help from her guardian angels: “I believe
that good spirits block it so that I don’t receive too
much other images or hear things. Otherwise that scares
me and I can’t breathe. I sit there and can’t breathe. I
think that we all have angels who guard and protect us.
They can prevent some things, but some not”. She expe-
rienced direct help form her “Great Guardian Angel”
(who she identified as the archangel Michael) in the be-
ginning of her psychosis, when her apartment was liter-
ally flooded with imagined others: “You don’t have any
private life. You can’t take a shower in private. There’s
running everyone through your apartment: Grandpa,
children, fat and thin ones, people you don’t know. That
gets on your nerves, it is just too much. Then I begged
my Great Guardian Angel to throw everyone out who
didn’t belong to me. It worked! I know that my Guardian
Angel will throw anyone out who get’s on my nerves. I
feel protected in that regard. – You cannot block the im-
ages. They are simply there, but no one ever did any-
thing to me physically. I’m often scared, but, well – you
cannot ignore that! You get used to it, get more deter-
mined and say: get away! I call them names if they insult
me. – During daytime, there’s light and it’s easier. In the
night, if you are roused, you are more sensitive. Hid-
eous!” As can be seen, the protection and support by her
guardian angels was selective (i.e., no bad spirit ever did
anything to her physically, but she was scared and fre-
quently unable to breathe; the guardian angels can pre-
vent some things, but not others) and out of her control
(i.e., the angels’ help obviously works better during day-
time because of the light, but it is needed more during
the night when it is dark).
Nonetheless, the guardian angels offered help and re-
lief from her point of view: “It is a connection of the
heart. I feel it immediately, if he (Michael) stands behind
me” (which would be called a leibhaftige Bewusstheit:
awareness of an incarnated other, typically behind one-
self and out of sight, from a psychiatric vantage) She
even described this position to be the usual one of an-
gels: “You have angels in the fashion of a half-circle be-
hind you”. She reported a scene from her night-shifts
when she was (previously) employed in a care facility,
roughly four years ago, in which she experienced direct
help: “I was on night-shift, it was Sylvester, and I was
alone. And he ran through the house in his uniform, just
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daytime and had been robed in his military uniform, J.S.).
And he frequently laid down in other peoples’ beds (as
when he was still alive, being quite demented, J.S.). […] I
was unsure if I just imagined him or not. And I asked my
guardian angels, and Michael, to walk in front of me and
the others behind me. And it worked. He (the spirit of the
man who died that day, J.S.) stood at the staircase and
looked up to me, all night. If he was truly a spirit, he must
have seen the angels. And if I just imagined him, then I
imagined him in adequate fashion”. This report demon-
strates besides the gradual realness of her hallucinations,
as is frequent in schizophrenia, and the delusional quality
of her interpretations, the limit of her angels’ support.
They did not chase or guide away the spirit of the dead
man, nor did they render him harmless or convince Mrs.
F. that he was harmless (for her) in a fundamental sense,
or block her imagination (if it was imagined, as she
mused). Instead, they protected her outwardly and in a
more physical sense, as if they were some kind of super-
natural body-guards.
As can be seen, Mrs. F. interpreted her hallucinatory
experiences with the traditional concepts of angels,
spirits and the like. Being raised in a very traditional
Catholic manner, she had believed in the possible reality
of angels and evil spirits all her life, and hence immedi-
ately valued and retrospectively evaluated her first
psychotic experiences as ultimate proof of their pres-
ence. Nonetheless, it proved to be a delusional convic-
tion, and not a religious belief, according to modern
psychopathological criteria. For example, she did not be-
lieve in angels, but knew them to be a fact (which is not
astonishing taking her experiences into account). Thus,
her delusional conviction was judged as a justified belief
from her point of view, even though the veridicality of
angels can neither be proven nor falsified on rational
grounds (see i.e., the classical argument of David Hume
on wonders [23], p. 171 ff.). Accordingly, Mrs. F. did not
pursue the goal of changing these important ‘facts’, since
she already knew that she was unable to change them
(being facts from her point of view). Often, this extraor-
dinary conviction of delusional convictions is achieved
in the course of the illness and involves different ways of
proving, testing and approving the reality of these ‘facts’
in its course. Mrs. F. commented this problem in an off-
hand manner: “What is true? What is not true? What is
real? You know, when you see your own parents (who
died some years before this event), and you talk with
them. What shall you believe? […] If you get used to it,
then it’s just how it is”. Consequently, Mrs. F. tried to
co-exist with these delusional experiences, i.e., visits of
friends or loved ones who died long ago, or delusional
perceptions. She behaved in accordance with them, and
set out goals that were at least not directed against herdelusional convictions. This ‘feeling of normality’ did not
mean that she got used to these experiences cavalierly.
On the contrary, they sometimes still upset her. “I saw a
colleague from my night shifts last night (Mrs. F.
stopped night shifts years ago). She was a very sweet-
natured person who died much too young. This (kind of
visit) is not so problematic as i.e., a figure whom you
cannot puzzle out. Nonetheless, it’s not really great”.
Mrs. F. described in detail how they entered the living-
room simultaneously, Elizabeth (pseudonym), her col-
league, from the floor through the wall, and she herself
coming in from the balcony through the door: “We
greeted each other – and that was it”.
The factuality of “this other world”, as she used to call
it, did not imply that she could not influence the pres-
ence of spirits other than by calling upon her guardian
angels. She could, as was already reported, also influence
apparitions by being engaged with familiar others. “That
is just like rolling thunder in the background (the other
world J.S.). Sometimes, if I’m engaged with my grandson,
it (the rolling thunder, J.S.) is not even there. But that is
only a distraction, it (this other world, J.S.) is always
there”. Obviously Mrs. F. could experience a flow-state
of mind if being engaged with her grandson, even
though she immediately devalued this freedom of action
as ‘distraction’ if starting to reflect upon it. From her
point of view she was convinced that the evil spirits were
never banned, but only absent for a short moment. She
reported that highly predictable, repetitive and, with the
exception of her young grandson, socially isolated situa-
tions were best suited to provoke such ‘experiences of
distraction’: “Sometimes I listen to audio books. I do
that. That helps, carries me away. I slip out of my situ-
ation. I need happy ends. I have listened at least three
times to it (a certain audio book with several episodes,
J.S.), there is nothing new in it anymore. That works! If
something bad happens, I already know that it’s over
soon. […] It’s only stories, a different world. That world
is defined and fixed, I am acquainted with it, nothing
can scare me anymore. That distracts me from this
world – It is important to know what is about to
come”. However, these strategies were not altogether re-
liable, especially during the night, as Mrs. F. reported.
Nonetheless, her conceptualization of these psychotic
(hallucinatory) experiences as apparitions of spirits or
angels was comforting insofar as it provided and offered
a comprehensive explanation. Mrs. F. did not provide a
precise description of the prodromal and early stages of
her psychosis, usually avoiding these questions. None-
theless, the delusional insight of archangel Michael’s
givenness and protection came after a longer period of
horrifying and perplexing experiences as described
above, most probably involving a stage of trema, or delu-
sional mood, as described by Conrad ([24]; see also
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admission to a psychiatric ward as well as her religious be-
lief supported the development of a complex delusional
system, which helped her to comprehend the otherwise in-
comprehensible (“… reason tells you that this is impos-
sible”). It was, furthermore, her own activity which led to
these delusional insights. Her own ideas helped her to
understand the obscure changes going on in her world; it
was her mental activity that hammered out the details in
her (valuable) explanation for formerly and otherwise in-
comprehensible changes which took place in her world for
over twenty years. It is a classical psychopathological
insight that the delusional convictions explaining the
otherwise incomprehensible changes in the world are ex-
perienced and valued as personally achieved (already
Hagen [26]; Sandberg [5]; see also [24]).
There is, furthermore, a missing effectivity in the so-
cial dimension. Despite their best efforts, persons with
delusions are typically totally unable to convince others
that their delusional convictions are true. (A clear excep-
tion is folie à deux (shared psychosis) which I will not
discuss in this paper). Mrs. F. also faced such difficulty
in her personal relationships as well as in her profes-
sional life. In this social niche she hid her psychotic ex-
periences behind the culturally accepted topic of
‘esoteric phenomena’. In contrast to her own experience,
the people calling her could believe her to be a medium
or not, to have such apparitions or not. If she had, how-
ever, tried to convince her clients to the extent that she
was convinced herself, they might call her ‘mad’ or
‘psychotic’. Obviously, interpersonal verification usually
evaluates the deluded person’s point of view as ‘incor-
rect’, ‘non common-sensical’, ‘unusual’, ‘weird’, or even,
psychopathologically correctly, as ‘delusional’. In other
words, interpersonal support of one’s world- or self-view
is seldom available [27]. This often enhances social isola-
tion, an important factor in maintaining delusions (even
in folie à deux [2,3,27,28].
As the case of Mrs. F. demonstrates, a history of delu-
sional and hallucinatory experiences implies the acquisi-
tion of new intentions of anticipation on the perceptual
as well as the valuing-level, mirroring her repeated ex-
perience of apparitions, whether evil or beneficient, and
their reflective consideration. Their initially baffling non-
axiological properties (i.e., they have translucent or even
transparent bodies that can move through all kinds of
materials, but are able to speak and intentionally focus
on the scene) are no longer baffling, but accustomed, as
well as repeatedly tested and approved. This also entails
the perception of certain action-properties that corres-
pond to one’s delusional insights and convictions on the
one hand, and one’s experiential history and one’s
(behavioural) projects on the other (i.e., you cannot
chase them away, but must call for help from yourguardian angels instead). Insofar as one’s perceived action-
properties and their pre-reflective valuing also mirror
one’s former (and possibly accustomed) delusional experi-
ences and one’s actions, behaviours or projects are answer-
ing these experiences. For example, Mrs. F. reacted
automatically and nearly off-handedly when she met
“Elizabeth”. She neither abreacted nor was perplexed or
baffled, since such a meeting was not out of the ordinary.
Or, as Mrs. F. commented: “You get used to everything”.
Her life-world was constantly double-fold for over 2 de-
cades, as she was well aware. Consequently she did not ex-
pect this “other world” to cease to exist, although some of
these (psychotic) “other-world-experiences” were annoy-
ing or even horrifying. On the contrary, it would have
been truly astonishing if such apparitions would not
have taken place anymore. In other words: she did not
simply actively develop a delusional explanation for the
changes in her world and experience, but developed a
delusional habituality in addition to her common-
sensical habituality. Her psychotic experiences were part
of her familiar workspace, even though this familiarity
did not imply a cozy feeling of being at home in her
life-world. Accordingly persons with delusional convic-
tions are typically able to provide reasons for their be-
haviour that are in accordance with these convictions
[29] p. 108 a. 113 ff.
Obviously, one’s delusional insights and convictions
provide only superficial knowledge regarding the im-
provement of one’s situation, as Mrs. F.’ experiences
demonstrate quite clearly. Her delusional insights as well
as her profound acquaintance with psychotic experiences
(hallucinations, apparitions, delusional perceptions) did
not really help her to change the givenness of the appari-
tions or other hallucinatory experiences and their delu-
sional interpretation. This would, from a psychiatric
vantage point, most probably support the regular use of
a neuroleptic medication. She could, however, more eas-
ily cope with these hallucinations, being less startled and
perplexed, and being able to distract herself actively
from her otherwise constant awareness of “this other
world”. These strategies were more or less habitualized
and integrated in a highly structured daily routine, and
supported her (relative) mental stability, helping her to
feel at least partially “at home” in her life-world. None-
theless, she recognized the limitations of her strategies
and behavioural options. She located her impairments
on the level of intentional action, but not on the level of
free will: “It depends on how much strength you have, in
order to come to term with things. That is important”.
From a psychiatric perspective there is, however, a cru-
cial and underlying impairment of free will, which is nei-
ther recognized nor reflectively attributed by Mrs. F.
This refers primarily to the impossibility to de-select the
delusional convictions and accept different and more
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psychotic experiences, entailing different and possibly
more effective strategies (i.e., including neuroleptic
medication). Delusional convictions are obviously mixed
blessings with respect to goals and strategies deriving
from or depending on one’s delusional convictions, since
they are usually neither achievable nor effective in a rad-
ical way. The “other world” was constantly the other side
of her life-world, rendering her double-fold life-world
both familiar and unhomelike at the same time.
Limitations of lived autonomy in delusions
The missing effectivity to achieve goals with means
founded on delusional convictions does not, contrary to
what would be suspected, lead to a situation in which
the deluded person reflectively re-frames these convic-
tions (called incorrigibility in Jaspers’ sense). Similarly,
neither the difference between one’s (delusional) convic-
tions, and the knowledge, interpretations or convictions
of one’s peer group, nor the acknowledgement that
knowledge is, in principal, falsifiable, provoke a critical re-
view. Instead, delusional convictions are pre-reflectively
valued by the deluded person as “true” [4]. Furthermore,
from the deluded person’s point of view, her delusional
convictions are connected with her ideal of truth. In other
words: the delusional convictions are not only pre-
reflectively valued as true, they are also reflectively
reconstructed as truth. This implies a profound intellec-
tual incorrigibility of one’s delusional convictions. The in-
corrigibility is the most salient feature of missing
effectivity in delusional disorders from a second- or third-
person-perspective. Furthermore, it is, as already noted
with reference to the case report, usually not even missed
by the person with delusions, since it is an apparently not
needed effectivity from her point of view (i.e., in the
sense of the highest and most stable form of uninten-
tional self-deception).
Profound incorrigibility on the level of a person’s exist-
ential convictions indicates a severe impairment of
freedom of the will. Nonetheless, deluded persons
experience their behaviour as self-determined when be-
having according to their delusional convictions. I para-
phrase here a famous description by Harry G. Frankfurt
on (as we will soon discover, another form of) incorri-
gible convictions: The delusional person cannot help be-
having in accordance with her delusional convictions. In
this respect, she is not free. On the contrary, she is in
the very nature of the case captivated by her delusionally
interpreted and perceived objects and by her delusional
convictions. Delusional convictions are, apparently, not a
matter of choice (and, due to their ‘intensity’, they
cannot even be perceived as a choice J.S.; [30], p. 135.
Pointedly, Frankfurt’s actual description concerns the
(pre-reflective) constraints love places upon ourvolitions. I simply changed words in the passage; the ori-
ginal states: “The person cannot help behaving in ac-
cordance with her love. In this respect, she is not free.
On the contrary, she is in the very nature of the case
captivated by her loved objects and by her love. […]
Love is, apparently, not a matter of choice” [30], p. 135.
Frankfurt concludes: “Our essential natures as individ-
uals are constituted, accordingly, by what we cannot
help caring about. The necessities of love, their relative
order or intensity, define our volitional boundaries. They
mark our volitional limits, and thus they delineate our
shapes as persons” [30], p. 138. Surely we cannot simply
compare love and delusions, even though such attempted
comparisons could claim a long tradition in philosophical
debates (e.g. as already started in Plato’s Phaedrus [31]).
Following these passages we can, however, state the simple
fact that delusional convictions are ‘dear’ to deluded
people as if they were ‘in love’ with them (not implying
that this involuntarily attachment must cause high feelings
or render the ‘loved one’ a source of bliss). A person’s de-
lusional convictions are intimately connected with this
person’s everyday life; a deluded person behaves in accord-
ance with her delusions because she simply cannot help
herself with respect to being and staying convinced, even
though her behaviour is in a specific manner ineffective. It
is usually not very effective with respect to a) convincing
others about the trueness of her convictions; b) achieving
goals directly derived from her delusional convictions;
and, especially, with respect to c) achieving these goals
with strategies according to her delusional convictions.
However, delusional convictions offer some kind of ‘epis-
temological’ rest by explaining the ongoing and disturbing
changes in the world. This may be not much for us, but is
usually very much for persons with delusions.
The important question regarding the freedom of the
deluded person’s will is therefore similar to the same
question with respect to people in love: Is the deluded
person at least free to set out some goals which do not
directly accord with her delusional convictions? If she can,
she will most surely have a double-orientation to reality
(Jaspers [6], p. 43 ff; Schwartz & Wiggins [8]). But if she
can’t, she will most probably dwell within a profound
‘paranoid atmosphere’ which means that her delusional
habituality and convictions completely dominate the man-
ner in which she discloses her world to herself (see also
Schlimme [4]). In the latter case, her ability to take an-
other person’s perspective into account would be highly
diminished if not lost. In other words: her competence to
honour the goods of agency, not only for herself but also
for others, would be specifically impaired due to her delu-
sional customs and convictions. But virtuous and self-
responsible agents are interested in treating others as
agents themselves. This kind of capability is crucial for be-
ing truly autonomous, as John J Drummond argues: “The
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ing decision for oneself; 2. thinking well and truly about
the situations in which one is called upon to act J.S.) are
necessary conditions for the possibility of rightly ordering
the goods for agents. These goods of agency must, there-
fore, be effectively willed in the virtuous pursuit of the
goods for an agent. Moreover, since one cannot think or
reason rightly by oneself, that is, since one must think for
oneself but cannot rightly think by oneself, these goods of
agency must be effectively willed for others as well as for
oneself” [12], p. 45 f. The effective willing, or at least pre-
reflective implication, of these goods of agency for others
is a key differentiation between a primarily ‘subjectively
autonomous’ behaviour, and a behaviour that can be at-
tributed as autonomous (self-determined) also from an-
other person’s perspective. We can therefore conclude
that a deluded person’s experience of being free can be a
correct and justifiable attribution, even if she is acting on
her delusions (and in this way comparable to people in
love). So, a behaviour can be called autonomous on a
‘framed’ level (level of freedom of intentional action), even
though not being autonomous on a higher (‘framing’) level
(i.e., level of freedom of the will), if, and only if, these
goods of agency for others are truly respected.
The case of Mrs. F. demonstrated a number of such
examples, indicating her ability to maintain a double-
orientation to reality. She also reported experiences of
lived autonomy on a reflective level that indicated a free-
dom of the will, but were typically not directly
connected with her delusional convictions. To give an
example for lived autonomy on the level of freedom of
the will from Mrs. F’s life story, we can refer to her move
to a major city two years ago as the most important de-
cision of the last years. Her major arguments for the
move, which she reported on enquiry were that a) sev-
eral members of her immediate family lived there
already for several years and had invited her to move
(several times); b) no other relative remained in her
former vicinity; and c) her best friend had died half a
year before and that she had no other relevant social
contacts in her locale. She summarized in one session:
“All that shows me (referring to an overview of her ac-
tual life-situation debated before, J.S.) that my decision
to have moved was as right as rain. That was obviously
right”. As can be seen, the goods of agency of her loved
ones and herself were respected in this decision at which
she arrived after some months of intense consideration
and discussions with her loved ones. Apparently delu-
sional convictions or psychotic experiences did not dir-
ectly influence this decision.
Discussion
A person with delusions is not free to choose her delu-
sional convictions. Her responsibility for her behaviourends, in principal, on the level of these delusional con-
victions; comparable, at least in an analogous sense, with
a person who is not responsible for being in love with
someone else. In both cases, however, responsibility can
extend to the behaviour which flows from these convic-
tions. In this respect the person with delusions is, at
least conceptually, not different from her fellow citizens
who have fallen in love. A person with delusions is inter-
personally embedded just like every other human being.
Apparently, if a person is interested in being a moral
agent, whether she is deluded or in love, she also needs
to be interested in reflectively judging whether her valu-
ings adequately correspond to her interests, and whether
her interests are best served by the way she behaves.
Consequently, a person with delusions who is a morally
responsible agent, or wants to be, is interested in inter-
subjective verifications of her own valuings, behavioural
options and interests and hence interested in the goods
of agency for herself and others. To re-iterate, this en-
tails that a person can be described as responsible for
her behaviour on a ‘framed’ level (i.e., level of freedom of
intentional action), even though she is not autonomous
on a higher (‘framing’) level (i.e., level of freedom of the
will), if, and only if, the goods of agency for others and
herself are truly (at least not arbitrary) respected. In
these cases the person with delusions could be called
autonomous.
The inability to rectify one’s delusional convictions
in reflection is, of course, not intentional. Various
phenomenologically-informed psychiatrists have de-
scribed this inability to reflectively reframe the delusional
knowledge as a passively suffered inability [7,9,24,32-35].
Hence, being deluded is not a matter of choice, but of suf-
fering. It is, however, usually supported by one’s percep-
tions. Or, to be more precise, it is supported by
cognitively-perceived non-axiological properties; proper-
ties of the perceived objects’ or of one’s situation. If one’s
delusional conviction could not be supported by one’s
world in this manner, one would not stay convinced of
these convictions, but would instead become aware that
one’s (delusional) valuings and ideas are wrong, and would
therefore sooner or later conclude that one was mistaken
(for this argument, see especially Musalek [3]). Mrs. F. also
received such worldly support in her perception. She re-
peatedly perceived translucent bodies, moving freely
through walls, crowding her apartment and life-world,
constraining her everyday-situations, commenting on her
behaviour, and so forth, which she pre-reflectively valued
and reflectively interpreted as ultimate proof for her
(delusional) conviction of “the other world”.
From a phenomenological point of view, ongoing delu-
sions and psychotic experiences supporting these delu-
sions can, accordingly, be described as a specific style of
habitualities. This specific style is, of course, a delusional
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As Binswanger claimed, in delusional mental life, one’s
cognition could (i.e., in severe psychotic states) both be
reduced to the level of a mechanical registration
(“mechanische Registration”) or impaired in the sense of
a monotonous disposition of experiences (“monotone
Erfahrungsbereitschaft”, [7], p. 469). Nonetheless, even if
mental life of a person with delusions is not levelled to a
mechanical registration or a monotonous disposition of
experiences, as was the case with Mrs. F., her reflective
activity is altered. On the one hand, she is unaware of
her (delusional) convictions as self-deception; on the
other hand, her imaginations are often primarily engaged
with, and limited to the psychotic experiences themselves.
This corresponds the finding that deluded people jump
more often to conclusions in experimental settings
([36,37]; a thoughtful integration in [34,38]). Similarly,
Hagen [26] argued that profound (existential) insecurity,
in the sense of the primary delusional experience, makes it
more necessary to achieve a delusional conclusion (see
also Binswanger [7], p. 447 ff). This tendency of delusional
habitualities to focus on the delusional topics indicates the
limitedness of the freedom of the deluded person’s will.
To acknowledge that persons with delusions can be
described as autonomous on the level of freedom of
intentional action if, and only if, others are respected as
(moral) agents, does not say that persons with delusions
necessarily act autonomously. Acting on delusions can
of course lead to immoral behaviour, because a person
with delusions is unable to deselect her delusional convic-
tions, and because she is profoundly and pre-reflectively
influenced by her delusional habituality. Moreover,
persons with delusions could also intentionally and
responsibly act immorally or illegally, even though they
are neither acting on delusions nor rendered unable to
grant goods of agency for others. If, however, she discloses
her life-world mainly, or solely in the manner of a delu-
sional workspace, which could be called a ‘paranoid at-
mosphere’, she cannot take the perspective of others
adequately into account [4]. Then the deluded person fol-
lows exclusively her “Wahnlogik” (logic of delusions), as
Ludwig Binswanger argued with respect to August
Strindberg’s concept of “fate’s logic”, [7], p. 536 ff. In this
condition she is neither responsible for her delusional con-
victions, nor for her behaviour following these convictions.
But this can be totally different if a person with delusions
maintains a double-orientation to reality ([6], p. 101
“doppelte Orientierung”; see Binswanger [7], p. 536 ff; Sass
[9]). Mrs. F., for example, managed to maintain such a
double-orientation to reality for over 29 years. This
double-orientation seems, however, to be frequent in
chronic schizophrenia. Nonetheless, it is challenging and
strenuous, because it is the person with delusions herself
who primarily must integrate both, often controversial,realities [8]. Living in such a double-orientation to reality
allows the person with delusions to select (delusional)
strategies which enable her to (partially) achieve her (delu-
sional) goals and, simultaneously, to respect relevant
norms of her community and society. Therefore, it can also
be addressed as an often eligible way of being in recovery
for people with chronic schizophrenia [4,8,27,39,40].
To acknowledge that persons with delusions can be-
have self-determinedly, autonomously and responsibly
does not deny (from a psychiatric point of view) that
they are ill and could, or maybe even: should, be treated.
They are, after all, most times at least partially
“unhomelike” in their double-fold life-world, as were
those of Mrs. F. This does not imply that deluded per-
sons experience themselves as effective with respect to
all aspects of their behaviour. They are usually unable to
convince others about the trueness of their convictions.
Furthermore, they are often ineffective in achieving goals
and applying strategies directly deriving from, or relying
upon, their delusional convictions. They are, however,
typically able to achieve an explanation for the changes
in their world. In this way, their freedom of intentional
action is (in addition to symptom-related impairments
of their free will) specifically altered. Persons with delu-
sions are, as the case report of Mrs. F. most clearly dem-
onstrated, able to experience themselves as free and self-
determined in certain situations and actions; and they
do in fact behave autonomously (and responsibly in a
personal and legal sense) when taking into account the
goods of agency in the situations in which they are
called upon to act adequately. This is not denying the
possibility of intentionally acting immorally, although
the others’ goods of agency are accepted in principal and
could be granted adequately. As has been argued above,
such an adequateness is even possible if acting on one’s
delusions. Although this need not be the case, and might
seldom be, it seems to be especially possible if this person
maintains a double-orientation to reality, implying that
she discloses her life-world in two ‘parallel’ or ‘each other
alternately eclipsing’ manners of familiar workspaces.
Therefore, our phenomenological investigation offers a
possible answer to the question posed in this paper.
Namely, yes, acting on delusions can indeed be autono-
mous, according to the person’s own experience of being
free and self-determined, if the goods of agency are ad-
equately respected not only for herself, but also for
others. Persons with delusions are, in this respect, quite
comparable to persons in love, who are also not free to
choose their convictions, but can be held responsible for
their behaviour flowing from their love. An important
difference can be named in the simple fact that persons
who have fallen in love tend to readily and deliberately
grant others the goods of agency, especially those whom
they love, while persons with delusions often have to
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their often double-fold familiar workspace. This seems
to foster the difficulty to determine whether a person
acting on delusions acted in fact autonomously, and was
hence responsible for her behaviour, or not. Notably, not
the manifest behaviour itself answers this question, but
the adequateness of granted goods of agency for others
in her familiar workspace, whether implied by virtues or
integrated by explicit deliberation. Our phenomeno-
logical descriptions of lived autonomy in delusions,
drawing on the classical and partial analogy between
people in love and people with delusions, offer some
clarifications regarding this most complex problem, but
they remain descriptions nonetheless. The acknowledge-
ment, however, that persons with delusions can behave
autonomously, even if they act on their delusions, seem –
at least to some extent – to be the grounds of a very trad-
itional idea in psychiatry: that professionals should also try
to be mediators between the different realities of their
patients, even though this might sometimes not work.
Endnote
aMrs. F. is my patient treated regularly in the Outpatient
Department of the Psychiatric University Hospital Charité
at St Hedwig Hospital Berlin, Germany. She gave me in-
formed consent to present her case and, specifically, to
quote transcripts from some of our therapeutic sessions.
“F.” is a pseudonym. Moreover, all patient information has
been deindentified.
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